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NOTES
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
This is a discussion of natural law and the right to travel, or freedom of
movement, as it is sometimes expressed,1 particularly in its relation to the pass-
port problem which arose in recent years in the Courts of the District of Colum-
bia. It will not involve a technical or philosophical discussion of the relation of
the right to travel to the natural law, but/rather a discussion of the legal evolu-
tion of the right in the light of the concept of the natural law as found in the
Declaration of Independence and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
When the authors of the Declaration placed in its opening paragraphs ref-
erence to the "laws of Nature and of Nature's God,"2 and later stated that
among the inalienable rights with which the Creator had endowed all men are
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," they expressed their recognition of
a natural law and its supernatural authorship. Their reference was not to rights
declared by positive law, or to those resting upon custom or usage. Their ref-
erence - their appeal - was to rights pertaining to the nature of man as a child
of God. No other interpretation of their language seems possible.
When the influence of Jefferson, powerfully augmented by Mason and others,
was drawn to the necessity for a Bill of Rights to become a part of the Consti-
tution, two of the three rights described as inalienable in the Declaration found
a place in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution itself: "nor shall any
person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
The vaguest of the original three - "the pursuit of happiness" - was not carried
forward in haec verbae. Instead, "property" is placed with "life" and "liberty"
as a possession of which one may not be deprived without due process of law.
We are concerned with "liberty." Its meaning is not as definite as that of
"life" and "property." 3 There would seem to be no basis, however, for giving
it a different meaning in the Declaration than in the Fifth Amendment. There
is too much of common origin in the use of the terms to believe that the authors
of the two state papers were thinking along very different lines. This is so even
though we remind ourselves that neither the Declaration nor the Constitution
contains a philosophical discussion of liberty to aid in comparing its use in one
with its use in the other.
Though the general scope of the liberty of the Declaration is the same as the
liberty of the Fifth Amendment, we are not precluded from making a distinction
derived from the context in which each appears. Thus, the liberty of the Declara-
1. SEE ZECHARIAH CHAPEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (U.
of Kansas Press, 1956).
2. Declaration of Independence.
3. This is so notwithstanding the fact that there can be much dispute also about the full
meaning of "property," often a matter of controversy in cases arising in varying circum-
stances. See, as a recent example, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
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tion is stated there to be inalienable, while the Fifth Amendment implies, at
least to some extent, that the liberty to which it refers is alienable with due process
of law. There may be some liberty not alienable in any circumstances; one may
not be deprived of it by any means, such as liberty of conscience. But the fact
that much of liberty, and even life, may be the subject of deprivation, does not
change the essential truth that the "unalienable" liberty of the Declaration is
essentially the liberty of the Fifth Amendment. In providing that no one could
be deprived of the latter without due process the Framers meant that all persons
had at least that much protection of all their liberty, and not that all liberty was
deprivable by due process.4
Liberty is not easily defined. And the necessity for laws to regulate the re-
lationship between society and the individual, and between individuals, calls
for continuing consideration of its meaning. That it covers a broad area of
conduct is demonstrated by its setting in the Declaration. The latter's reference
to liberty as an endowment of the God of Nature, and its proclamation against
enumerated tyrannies, against the suppression of liberty, throws light on the
meaning of the liberty proclaimed. Though the inalienable character at-
tributed to it was not entirely retained when the men of the revolutionary
period came to formulate a plan of government, the meaning of liberty was not
changed. Rather, its inalienable character was recognized as being subject to
some conditioning in the common good; its exercise in some instances could be
controlled by due process of law, by the law of the land as Magna Charta
originally expressed it.
It would seem clear enough that the underlying principle of the Declaration
is that man starts with liberty in his relations with his fellow man. But he
assumes, as the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment provide, the obligations
due to the Creator and, through Him, to his fellow man. The latter are often
expressed in valid law reasonably essential to the common good and to the pro-
tection of the liberty of all. If it seems contradictory to say that the inalienable
liberty of the Declaration is alienable by due process of law it is only to the
extent that the Declaration speaks of the fundamental right while the Constitu-
tion in its scheme of government places the fundamental right in the environ-
ment of a society organized to promote a common good and to avoid anarchy.
A natural limitation of individual liberty is seen to exist as soon as it is
realized -that the individual has natural relationships as part of a larger unit
of society, the family. This natural relationship prevents the father, for example,
from walking out on his child. There is no freedom of movement, no right to
travel, which dispenses with this parental obligation. And when the individual
is also considered as a member of the still larger unit comprising either the
immediate community or the state or nation - to go no further - other
limitations arise due to those relationships.
The further the individual moves away as it were into these larger units of
4. In referring to the Constitution mention has been made thus far of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which applies only to action by the Federal Government. Since the adoption in 1868
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of course are under the same constitutional
restraint; they too cannot deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
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society the weaker the natural restraints upon his liberty become. The natural
restraints upon the citizen, as citizen, are not as strong in relation to the state
as are the natural restraints upon the father, as father, in relation to his child.
In the larger units the bonds in which natural law holds the larger or more
numerous relationships become somewhat weakened and the requirements of posi-
tive law take hold, acting within due process of law. Perhaps it may be said
there occurs at times a sort of merging of the natural with the positive law, that
due process of law takes on a certain quality of natural law in regard to the
particular subject, and the natural law accommodates itself to due process of
law.
The passport cases gave rise to consideration of the meaning of liberty in
terms of international travel. The problem came to the courts because restric-
tions had been imposed by the federal government, during a presidentially de-
clared emergency, upon a citizen's ability to depart from or enter the United
States without a passport. 5 Issuance of passports had been lodged by law in
the Executive acting through the Secretary of State under presidentially ap-
proved regulations which set the "national interest" as the guide; and Congress
had made it unlawful for a citizen to depart from or enter the United States
without a passport.6
Some aspects of the law in relation to travel had been considered by the
Supreme Court before the passport cases arose. A brief review of the earlier
cases seems desirable.
In 1867, a year before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Crandall
v. Nevada7 was decided by the Supreme Court. Nevada had levied a tax of one
dollar upon each person leaving the state by common carrier. The Court did
not discuss freedom of movement, or the right to travel, as a basic liberty of the
individual. Finding the tax invalid, the opinion of Mr.. Justice Field assailed the
measure not as a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, but as pre-
venting free access of the citizen to the federal government. Heavy reliance was
placed upon the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger
Cases,8 decided in 1849, as follows:
Living as we do under a common government, charged with the great con-
cerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the United States, from the most
remote States or Territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the principal
departments established at Washington, but also to its judicial tribunals and
public offices in every State and Territory of the Union.... [A] tax imposed
by a State for entering its territories or harbours is inconsistent with the
rights which belong to the citizens of other States as members of the Union,
and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain.9
5. For purposes of simplicity this paper, it will be noted, refers in terms to citizens, not
to persons in general.
6. I have not thought it necessary in this discussion to set forth the details of the statutes,
proclamations, and regulations. These are found in the opinions of the Supreme Court in
Kent v. Dulles, and Briehl v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
7. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
8. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 463 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
9. Id. at 491-92.
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Mr. Justice Clifford and Chief Justice Chase thought the invalidity of the
state tax should rest upon the power of the federal government to regulate inter-
state commerce, to the general exclusion of state control.
Without suggesting that the opinion is inadequate, the difference between
the approach of the Court in Crandall and the larger view of the liberty to travel
subsequently recognized, is I think of interest. The starting point in Crandall
was not the existence of a basic liberty but the existence of a travel right incident
to national citizenship. Such a right depended upon the existence of the federal
government. It was not a right independent of the Constitution, of which one
could be deprived only by constitutional means.
After some years a case 10 arose in Louisiana which had nothing to do with
travel but which led to a valuable discussion of the nature of liberty. A Louisiana
statute prohibited anyone from effecting insurance on property within the state
with any marine insurance company which had not complied with all the laws
of Louisiana for the doing of business there. Pursuant to the statute Allgeyer
was convicted of placing insurance contracts for certain goods with a New York
insurance company which had not so qualified. In this rather prosaic set-
ting the opinion, by Mr. Justice Peckham, declared the statute violated due
process of law and proceeded to describe the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment as,
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free
to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will....
It was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Butchers' Union Company v.
Crescent City Company, 111 U.S. 746, 762, in the course of his concurring
opinion in that case, that "The right to follow any of the common occupa-
tions of life is an inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the
phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence, which
commenced with the fundamental proposition that 'all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' This right is a
large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen." 11
A few years later in Williams v. Fears,12 the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a tax levied by Georgia on the occupation of hiring persons to labor
outside the State. Against the validity of the statute was interposed the claim
of a citizen's right to move from one State to another. It was urged that the
tax abridged the citizen's privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and impaired "the natural right to labor." The Court upheld the
tax but said:
[T]he right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right,
ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right
10. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
11. Id. at 589-90.
12. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
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secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Con-
stitution.1 3
The Court quoted the meaning of liberty set forth in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, but
held that the impact of the statute on freedom of egress from the State, or on
freedom to contract, was only incidental and remote, was not discriminatory as
between citizens of other States and citizens of Georgia, and, moreover, that the
statute did not impinge upon the federal power to regulate interstate commerce.
Again the years passed and there came to the Court Edwards v. California.1 4
California in 1901 had enacted a statute to prohibit anyone from transporting
an indigent nonresident into its territory knowing the person to be nonresident
and indigent. Here was a problem of many human and practical facets. As in
Crandall and Williams, movement was affected. As in Crandall, the State's
restriction was held inconsistent with national interests. This time the majority
of the Court, as had the minority in Crandall, placed reliance upon the federal
control over commerce, Mr. Justice Byrnes saying for the majority, "it is unneces-
sary to decide whether the Section [of the state statute] is repugnant to other
provisions of the Constitution." 15
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for himself and Justices Black and Murphy, was
not content with this basis for striking down the statute, nor was Mr. Justice
Jackson, writing separately. Unwilling to equate the right of persons freely to
move with the regulation of the movement across state lines of "cattle, fruit,
steel and coal," Mr. Justice Douglas spoke of the right on a more human level,
concentrating upon the incidents of national citizenship and the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the privileges and immunities of citizens
from state interference. He said:
Now it is apparent that this right [to move from State to State] is not spe-
cifically granted by the Constitution. Yet before the Fourteenth Amendment
it was recognized as a right fundamental to the national character of our
Federal government. It was so decided in 1867 by Crandall v. Nevada, 6
Wall. 35.16
The opinion also called upon Williams v. Fears, to which we have already referred.
Mr. Justice Jackson eloquently supported the right of an indigent nonresident
to go into California as a privilege of national citizenship,1 saying:
Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of property
into one class free to move from state to state and another class that is pov-
erty-bound to the place where it has suffered misfortune is not only at war
with the habit and custom by which our country has expanded, but is also
a short-sighted blow at the security of property itself. Property can have no
13. Id. at 274.
14. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
15. Id. at 177.
16. Id. at 178 (concurring opinion).
17. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States .... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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more dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its
possession a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where those rights
are derived from national citizenship no state may impose such a test, and
whether the Congress could do so we are not called upon to inquire.18
None of the opinions in Edwards places the "right to travel" or "freedom of
movement" on quite the plane it occupies now as a result of the passport cases.
While the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas refers to freedom of movement as a
"personal liberty," quoting from Williams v. Fears, I believe it is accurate to say
that his opinion, as well as that of Mr. Justice Jackson, rested upon the position
that freedom to move from one state to another was an implicit right of national
citizenship; that is, as held in Crandall, a right derived from the Constitution
and not a liberty which existed apart from the Constitution, to be protected by
the Due Process Clauses from unlawful deprivation. 19
A decade and a half after Edwards the passport cases arose, involving the
control of foreign travel by federal authority.20 Bauer v. Acheson2 l was the
first of the cases. Miss Bauer, an American citizen, had been granted a passport
and had traveled to Paris. While she was there the Secretary of State, without
notice or hearing, revoked her passport, on the ground that "her activities are
contrary to the interests of the United States." The Secretary refused to renew
the passport except to enable Miss Bauer to return to the United States. Under
the law and regulations as then administered it was unlawful for an American
citizen to travel to Europe or to enter the United States from Europe without a
valid passport. Miss Bauer sought relief by suing the Secretary in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. A statutory three-judge court,
composed of District Judges Curran and Keech, and the present writer as the
Circuit Judge, was constituted to hear the case, Judge Keech writing the opinion
for himself and Judge Curran.22
Judge Keech brought the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for
the first time directly into a judicial opinion on the right to travel. He drew
upon the dicta of Williams v. Fears, which in turn had drawn upon the dicta
of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, and then applied to travel beyond the United States
the views expressed in those opinions that freedom of movement from state to
state was "an attribute of personal liberty." He said:
Since denial of an American passport has a very direct bearing on the
applicant's personal liberty to travel outside the United States, the executive
department's discretion, although in a political matter, must be exercised
with regard to the constitutional rights of the citizens, who are the ultimate
source of all governmental authority.
The liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute. . . . Thus,
18. 314 U.S. at 185 (concurring opinion).
19. See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 189 et seq.
20. State action is not involved to any degree in the passport cases. The control over
passports has long since been vested solely in the Federal Executive.
21. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
22. The writer dissented on jurisdictional grounds only, believing the case to be one for
a single district judge to decide, rather than for a court specially constituted of three judges
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958).
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freedom to travel abroad, like other rights, is subject to reasonable regulation
and control in the interest of the public welfare. However, the Constitution
requires due process and equal protection of the laws in the exercise of that
control.23
The action of the Secretary in revoking the passport was set aside unless a hearing
were accorded within a reasonable time. Bauer thus applied the standards of
procedural due process to the methods by which the federal government could
restrict travel; that is, the right to travel was held to be a liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment from deprivation without a hearing. The Secretary of
State appears to have acquiesced in the decision, and the case did not reach the
Court of Appeals.
We come now to the developments which grew out of the Shachtman case.
The Secretary of State had denied a passport to Mr. Shachtman. The District
Court upheld the Secretary on the theory that the issuance of passports was a
political matter within the Secretary's discretion and that the judiciary accord-
ingly must not interfere. This theory had been considered sound during most of
our history when it was not unlawful to travel without a passport; but when
the Shachtman case reached the Court of Appeals the problem could not longer
be solved in those simple terms.2 4 A passport had become more than a political
document to facilitate the amenities of foreign travel; the government was now
requiring a citizen to have a passport to enable him to go to Europe; that is,
the absence of a passport constituted a restraint upon travel there. As in Bauer
the question was whether this was the deprivation of a liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals held that such a liberty was involved. Bauer had
attached to this liberty the protection of procedural due process. Shachtman
extended to it the protection of substantive due process; that is, not only must
the method of restraint be fair and appropriate but the substantive content of
executive criteria for travel control must not be unreasonable, and the question
of reasonableness was to be considered in light of the high character of the
liberty sought to be restrained. The court said the discretionary power of the
Secretary was confined to grounds25 which when challenged must satisfy judi-
cially established criteria of substantive due process. The determination as to
this could not be left entirely to the Executive because, since a liberty of the
individual was affected, the judiciary had a responsibility in a case or contro-
versy to resolve the issue consistently with the Fifth Amendment.2 6
Bauer had required procedural due process-there notice and hearing-
23. 106 F. Supp. at 451.
24. Shachtman v. Dulles, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 287, 225 F.2d 938 (1955). The case was
decided by the Court of Appeals composed of Judge Edgerton, Judge Washington, and
the present author. The opinion written by the author was concurred in by both his
colleagues. Judge Edgerton also wrote a separate concurring opinion.
25. "Discretionary power does not carry with it the right to its arbitrary exercise."
96 U.S. App. D.C. at 290, 225 F.2d at 941.
26. We are not concerned in this discussion with what constitutes either procedural or
substantive due process in any of the varying circumstances in which the question might
arise. Our problem is rather whether due process is necessary to the validity of the denial
of a passport when such denial causes the individual to be restricted in his travel.
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on the basis that the right to travel was a personal liberty. The main Shachtman
opinion described this right as "a natural right." 27 Under each description it
was a liberty within the meaning of the Declaration and the Fifth Amendment.28
It would be unacceptable to give the liberty declared in the Declaration and
safeguarded by the Amendment a meaning which did not include such a basic
attribute of man. Of course, calling the right a natural one did not make it so;
one must rather appraise the soundness of the judgment which ascribes that
character to it. It seemed to the court to be so obviously a part of the whole man
as to be natural to him; and if that were so, the right to its exercise was a
natural one, a part of the natural law. The physical limitations imposed by
mountain, water, desert, or otherwise, do not affect the nature of the right itself.
They bear upon the ability to exercise it; so, too, the restraints and prohibitions
imposed throughout history, in peace and in war, by rulers and by positive law,2 9
during the evolution of the means by which society is governed. Like speech,
a normal attribute of man, movement is a liberty to be curtailed in a free society
only by means and for reasons which meet the tests such a society establishes
for the regulation of individual freedom.
The Shachtman case did not reach the Supreme Court. The executive branch
of the Government, as we shall see, accepted the basic thesis of the opinion, and
a passport was issued to Mr. Shachtman. But somewhat later the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the cases of Kent v. Dulles and Briehl v. Dulles3 O
after their decision by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc. The full Court
of Appeals had reaffirmed the Shachtman approach, saying that limitations upon
travel by passport controls were "as we said in Shachtman v. Dulles, an infringe-
ment upon a natural right of a citizen to travel." But a majority of the nine
members of the court upheld the denial of the passports by the Secretary.3'
They found due process of law had not been denied by the Secretary's insistence,
as a condition to issuance of a passport to either applicant, that he submit a
sworn statement as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist,
which the applicant refused to do.3 2
After Shachtman was decided by the Court of Appeals and before the Su-
preme Court decided Kent and Briehl there were published two discussions
which were to be referred to in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. One
was Professor Chafee's study already mentioned and the other an article by
27. "The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit
is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law."
96 U.S. App. D.C. at 290, 225 F.2d at 941.
28. The Supreme Court, as we have seen, in its opinion in Williams v. Fears had referred
to the "natural right to labor."
29. See generally CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 1.
30. These companion cases are reported at 357 U.S. at 116.
31. Briehl v. Dulles, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 248 F.2d 561 (1957).
32. Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Edgerton, dissented, being of the view that Congress
had not delegated to the Executive authority to deny a passport to a citizen on any ground
to which the unanswered question related; that is, on grounds having ideological overtones.
This was the position adopted by a divided Supreme Court. The present writer dissented
also but on the more limited ground that though power had been given by Congress, the
Secretary had not been justified in denying the passports without exercising a judgment of
his own rather than permitting the refusal to answer the question to operate as a denial.
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Professor Jaffe in Foreign Affairs. Professor Chafee expressed some disagree-
ment with the reliance by the Justices in Edwards v. California solely upon either
the commerce or the privileges and immunities provision of the Constitution.
In this connection he wrote:
Why do we need to struggle through the swamp of the rights of United
States citizens when we can walk on solid ground? Already in several deci-
sions the Court has used the Due Process Clause to safeguard the right of
the members of any race to reside where they please inside a state, regard-
less of ordinances and injunctions. Why is not this clause equally available
to assure the right to live in any state one desires? And unreasonable re-
straints by the national government on mobility can be upset by the Due
Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment, if the Schachtman [sic] case on
passports (to be discussed soon) is upheld by the Supreme Court. Thus
the "liberty" of all human beings which cannot be taken away without due
process of law includes liberty of speech, press, assembly, religion, and also
liberty of movement.38
Professor Jaffe also referred sympathetically to the Shachtman characterization
of the right to travel as a liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.3 4
Another and important statement of position should be noted. The Solicitor
General of the United States in his brief filed with the Supreme Court in the
Kent and Briehl cases said:
[W]hile this Court has not yet decided whether the Constitution protects the
travel of citizens across the boundaries of the nation as it protects their travel
across state boundaries, we do not challenge, but readily accept, the exist-
ence of a general "natural" or "constitutional" right to depart from or enter
the country as an aspect of the "liberty" subject to the protections of the
Constitution. We fully accede to the definitive ruling of Shachtman v. Dulles,
225 F.2d 938, 941 (C.A.D.C.) - confirmed in substance in the opinions
below -that there is a "right to travel" and that restraints on that right
must conform to the Fifth Amendment. Our position in these cases does
not deny that principle, but rather rests on the claim that what the Secretary
has done here accords with both the procedural and the substantive aspects
of due process of law.3 5
The principal Supreme Court opinion, appearing in the Kent case, states,
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much
is conceded by the Solicitor General.8 6
The Court then cites Professor Chafee and refers to the Court's earlier decisions
in Crandall, Williams and Edwards, continuing, "Freedom to travel is, indeed,
33. CHAFEE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 192-93.
34. Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAMS 17,
21 (1956).
35. Brief for Government, pp. 26-27, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
36. 357 U.S. at 125. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas and con-
curred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Brennan. Mr.
Justice Clark wrote the dissenting opinion.
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an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty,' "37 and includes it among the
activities which are "natural and often necessary to the well-being of an Ameri-
can citizen." 38
Thus, though Bauer and Shachtman were not cited, the Supreme Court
accepted the views advanced in the opinions in those cases as to the nature of
the right to travel.
And so the matter stands today in the courts: the right to travel - a natural
or personal right - is a liberty within the protective provisions of the Fifth
Amendment. The consequence is that proceedings looking toward restraint upon
this liberty, at the hands of federal authority, must conform with constitutional
provisions, including both procedural and substantive due process of law. Thus
it is fair to say that the positive law, insofar as it is evidenced by judicial think-
ing, recognizes the right to travel, or freedom of movement, as a part of the
natural law, as within the idea of liberty with which all men are endowed by
their Creator, to return to the Declaration, the starting point of our discussion.
This liberty does not depend for its existence upon the Constitution or upon
any other positive law, though a citizen is protected by the Constitution from
its deprivation without due process of law.
One starts out as it were with freedom to travel, to go from place to place,
but on the way one may be held to the use of this freedom so as, in
the common good, to safeguard the freedom of others. One starts out with an
inalienable liberty and is nevertheless bound to recognize its partial alienability.
The natural right exists but its exercise is subject to "reasonable regulation under
law,"3 9 so that the natural and the positive law begin to merge, the positive law
itself, however, being subject to limitations as to the means and the reasons by
which it can limit the fullness of the natural right. For liberty is precious and
one may be deprived of it only by methods which are fair and for reasons which
are sound and rest on the common good, on a good so great as to outweigh in
some circumstances the great good of individual liberty. 40
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37. Id. at 127. The Court found it unnecessary, however, to decide whether the control
over this liberty of Mr. Kent and Mr. Briehl had been exercised consistently with con-
stitutional safeguards in the denial of the passports. The constitutional questions were
not reached because the Court found, as had the dissent of Judge Bazelon in the Court
of Appeals, concurred in by Judge Edgerton, that Congress had not delegated to the
Executive authority to exercise by passport control restriction on travel of a citizen upon
the basis of his associations and beliefs. The dissenting Justices, for whom Mr. Justice Clark
wrote the opinion, were of the view Congress had delegated to the Executive the questioned
power; but since the majority held otherwise, the dissenting Justices also refrained from
discussion of the merits of the constitutional questions.
38. Id. at 129.
39. Shachtman v. Dulles, supra note 24.
40. This discussion has intentionally omitted, as somewhat irrelevant to its theme, treat-
ment of the Government's right to control travel to a particular territorial area, such, e.g.,
as the portions of China under Communist control. See Worthy v. Herter, 106 U.S. App.
D.C. 153, 270 F.2d 905, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
